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Abstract
In 2000, government deregulation along with the introduction of the long−term insurance
scheme allowed for−profit providers of at−home care for the elderly to compete directly with
nonprofit operators. According to the contract failure hypothesis, we would expect
consumers to prefer nonprofit providers over their for−profit counterparts as a result of
information asymmetry and non−distributional constraints. We take advantage of household
level data to examine whether households￿f choice of care provider is biased toward
nonprofits. We find that nonprofit providers￿f larger market share is at least partly explained
by having operated in the market longer and by continuing restrictions in medical and
institutional care that confer various advantages on nonprofit providers. However, we do find
that user with better knowledge of providers tend to favor for−profit providers, suggesting
that measures to reduce information asymmetries may help to provide a more level playing
field.
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     Do consumers prefer nonprofit or for-profit services? This classical and frequently 
debated issue is of considerable interest both for academics and policy-makers. It became of 
very practical interest in Japan following the introduction of public long-term care insurance 
and deregulation of the market for at-home care for the elderly in the spring of 2000 (Mitchell, 
Piggott and Shimizutani 2004). While for-profit operators had been allowed to offer their 
services previously, users were not reimbursed, meaning that only the wealthy were able to 
afford them and the market was accordingly small. Everyone else was assigned to nonprofit 
providers as part of the government welfare policy. The introduction of the long-term 
insurance scheme for the first time pitched for-profit and nonprofit providers head to head, 
with users free to choose and having to make copayments of 10 percent of the cost, no matter 
what type of provider they chose (as long as it is government-approved).   
     The  government’s  policy  was  based  on  the expectation that the entry of for-profits 
would contribute toward making the market more competitive. However, it should be noted 
that this outcome is not a foregone conclusion. If consumers’ preferences are biased toward 
nonprofit services, market participation of for-profits will have little effect on competition. 
One possible explanation of this potential outcome is the “contract failure” hypothesis 
(Hansmann 1980): If consumers cannot observe the quality of services in advance, they may 
prefer to choose nonprofit providers. It may be perfectly rational for them to do so because of 
“non-distributional constraints,” i.e. that fact that nonprofit operators are not allowed to 
distribute any operating surpluses among their owners and hence face fewer incentives to 
raise such surpluses by lowering the quality of their service. In contrast, for-profits, by their 
very nature, may be inclined to raise profits by lowering the quality of their service.   
     This  risk  of  opportunistic  behavior  by for-profits provided the justification for the 
traditional solution in Japan to allow only nonprofit enterprises to operate in the market. 
However, in the face of a rapidly aging population, the Japanese government was forced to 
change the entry policy in order to overcome the bottleneck in the supply of care for the 
elderly. Almost five years have passed since the introduction of the new entry policy, and 
wide-ranging reform of the public insurance scheme for the elderly is to be implemented in 
the spring of 2006. In spite of this innovative institutional change, there has been little 
research on the determinants of Japanese consumers choices regarding nonprofit and 
for-profit at-home care providers.   
     The  Japanese  at-home  long-term  care market is unusually suitable for testing the 
“contract failure” hypothesis because government regulation stipulates that output prices must 
be the same for all types of providers. Service contents are also heavily regulated and 
standardized across providers. Service contents are also heavily regulated and standardized 
across providers, meaning that consumers’ choice should reflect preferences regarding 
nonprofit and for-profit providers free of distortions that price or product differentiation 
would introduce. At the same time, this of course prevents us from considering the effect of 
pricing behavior of different types of providers and any effect this would have on consumer 
choice. 
     This  study  takes  advantage  of  a  unique micro-level data set to test consumer 
preferences with regard to the different types of providers. First, we address whether the 
quality of services provided by nonprofit organizations is better than that of profit-seeking 
organizations. Several earlier studies, such as Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002) and Suzuki 
(2002), have examined quality differences between service providers based on suppliers’ data. 
However, to our best knowledge, there has been little research examining the hypothesis 
based on demand-side data. Second, we examine the determinants of households’ choice 
between different types of service providers. To explore these issues, micro-data from recipients is utilized to examine the hypothesis because information asymmetry biases care 
users’ preferences toward nonprofits, regardless of the quality of service. Concretely, we 
examine households’ choice of provider along with an array of variables influencing the 
selection of type of at-home care provider.   
     The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of previous studies, 
most of which have been conducted in the United States. Section 3 describes the data set used 
in this study. Section 4 presents the specification of the model used for the empirical analysis 
and discusses the estimation results. Section 5 draws policy conclusions from our empirical 
findings.   
 
2.  Review of Previous Studies 
 
          In contrast with the situation in Japan, there are plenty of studies in Western countries 
that analyze consumer behavior with regard to nonprofit and for-profit organizations. The 
starting point of any discussion of this topic is usually the “contract failure” approach 
proposed by Hansmann (1980), on which most subsequent studies are based. 
     Hansmann’s  discussion  begins  with  two key concepts: asymmetry of information and 
non-distributional constraints. As highlighted by Akerlof (1970), quality uncertainty is 
inevitably due to the asymmetry of information between sellers and buyers. Under this 
asymmetry, consumers are not able to observe the quality of products in advance. This is 
especially crucial in the service sector.   
          If this is the case, which type of provider do consumers choose to purchase services 
from? Suppose there are two types of providers: for-profits and nonprofits. By definition, the 
nonprofit sector is prohibited from paying out profits to its owners. Hence, retained profits are 
utilized to provide higher wages for staff, contributing to a higher quality of service. In 
contrast, for-profits need to make a profit, which is distributed to stockholders, inviting 
opportunistic behavior to decrease costs by lowering the quality of services. This mechanism 
motivates consumers to choose to purchase services from nonprofits rather than from 
for-profits. Consumers choose nonprofit services because they believe that nonprofit suppliers 
provide higher quality services, though this perception may not necessarily be related to the 
actual quality of service delivered by either type of provider.
2  
     Apart  from  the  contract  failure  hypothesis, another explanation as to why consumers 
might prefer nonprofits over for-profits is that the different types of providers behave 
differently. While managers of for-profits are assumed to maximize profits only, managers of 
nonprofits may derive greater utility from improving the quality of services as well as 
increasing profits. Newhouse (1970) argues that managers in the not-for-profit sector have 
fewer incentives to lower the quality of services provided, since their performance is judged 
by quality, or they desire to show professional excellence or technical virtuosity by stressing 
quality. 
          While some studies proceed by modeling the contract failure hypothesis (Easley and 
O’Hara (1983, 1988), Chillemi and Gui (1991), Hirth (1999)), there are relatively few 
empirical studies that directly examine consumer choice with regard to different types of 
providers. One exception is the study by Holtmann and Ullmann (1993), and in what follows 
we use their relatively simple framework to analyze the choice problem faced by consumers.   
                                            
2  Noguchi and Shimizutani (2002) confirm that there is a nonprofit wage premium in the Japanese elderly 
care market. Although this is interpreted to imply higher quality, the belief that higher costs imply higher 
quality is not always well founded. Reduced incentives for nonprofits to enforce contracts and develop 
internal controls may result in economically inefficient organization. In this case, higher costs do not 
necessarily mean better quality (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002) show that, 
indeed, the quality of services offered by nonprofits is not always higher than that offered by for-profits.        We  assume  that  a  consumer purchases services from nonprofits (Qn) and for-profits (Qp). 
Since the consumer cannot judge the quality of services in advance, the quality is uncertain. 
However, for simplicity, we assume that the quality of nonprofit services is certain, but this is 
not the case with for-profits. Thus, we define the actual unit of for-profit services as Q
*
p=zQp 
where z is a random variable with E(z)=1 .   
     A  consumer  maximizes  his  utility  EU(Qn, Q
*
p) under the budget constraints 
pnQn+ppQp=Y and Qn≥0 and Qp≥0. The utility function is assumed to be increasing and 
concave in Qn, Qp, z. 
          We set up the Lagrangian as follows, with  λ   as the Lagrange multiplier: 
L= EU(Qn, Q
*
p)+  λ (Y－pnQn－ppQp)；Qn≥0 and Qp≥0 .                ( 1 )   
The first order conditions are:   
∂L/∂Qn=E(∂U/∂Qn)－λ pn≤0 




   (∂L/∂Qp) Qp=0 
∂L/∂ λ = Y－pnQn－ppQp =0 
Therefore, 
If Qp=0 and Qn>0, E(∂U/∂Qn)/ pn> E[(∂U/∂Q
*
p)z]/ pp 
If Qp>0 and Qn>0, E(∂U/∂Qn)/ pn= E[(∂U/∂Q
*
p)z]/ pp 
If Qp>0 and Qn=0, E(∂U/∂Qn)/ pn< E[(∂U/∂Q
*
p)z]/ pp 
     Given  that  government  regulation  stipulates uniform prices in the Japanese long-term 
care market (pp= pn), the choice between nonprofit and for-profit providers depends on the 
expected utility derived from using nonprofit providers, E(∂U/∂Qn), and for-profit providers, 
E[(∂U/∂Q
*
p)z]. We should note that E[(∂U/∂Q
*
p) z]= z E[∂U/∂Qp]+cov(z,∂U/∂Qp), 
where, by the concavity assumption, the second term on the right-hand side is negative. 
     Holtmann  and  Ullmann  (1993)  suggest  that this second term can be viewed as the 
marginal risk premium associated with for-profit care. In this case, uncertainty regarding the 
quality of services provided by the for-profit sector diminishes the expected utility and thus 
motivates consumers to choose nonprofit services. In other words, even if the average quality 
of for-profits and nonprofits is the same, the left-hand side is always greater than the right if 
the amount purchased is the same.
3  
     Thus,  we  must  address  two  issues.  The  first is to determine which type of provider 
offers a higher quality of services in practice. Earlier studies on this topic for the case of Japan 
have been inconclusive (see Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002) for a survey). We can then turn to 
the second issue: which type of provider is preferred by consumers. We examine these 
questions in the next section by taking advantage of our micro-level data set.   
 
3.  Description of the Data 
 
     The data set used in this study is based on the micro-level data from the “Survey on 
Long-term Care Users.” This survey was performed three times, in 2001, 2002 and 2003. The 
first survey was conducted from November to December 2001 by the Price Policy Division of 
the Cabinet Office. The households surveyed were chosen on the basis of a survey carried out 
by a private research company that randomly selects participants based on Japan’s household 
                                            
3  As indicated, in order to keep the “contract failure” model simple, we assume that the quality of services 
provided by for-profits is uncertain while that of nonprofits is certain. However, as the anonymous referees 
pointed out, contract failure of course is also possible in the case of nonprofits. Therefore, there remains the 
question of how effective nonprofit governing boards are in looking after the interests of service receivers 
and the public. However, addressing this topic is beyond the scope of this short paper.   registration system. The distribution of the “Survey on Long-term Care Users” resembles that 
of the Population Census. 
            In the Survey, a “care receiver” is defined as an elderly person receiving care in order 
to cope with daily life activities. The survey only includes those living at home with family 
members, i.e. those living in institutions are excluded. Moreover, the survey includes both 
those elderly whose care is paid for by the public insurance scheme (for which approval by 
the local government is required) and those paying for at-home care out of their own pockets.   
From all the observations of the “Survey of Long-term Care Users”, we randomly 
selected households with care receivers and, among those, chose 1,300 households with only 
one receiver
4. The research company mailed our questionnaires to these households and 
received responses from 1,005 households (for a response rate of 77.1 percent). 
     The  second  “Survey  on  Long-term  Care Users” was conducted by the same private 
research firm in October and November 2002, but this time under the aegis of the Economic 
and Social Research Institute. The notable merit of this survey is that it performed a similar 
survey on the same households as in the 2001 survey. Of the 1,005 households in the first 
survey, we obtained responses from 822. In 617 of these households, the elderly care receiver 
still lived at home with family members and received at-home care.
5  In addition, we selected 
new households with one care receiver and added 457 households to the sample. Thus, the 
sample size for 2002 is 1,074 households. 
          The third survey was also implemented by the Economic and Social Research Institute, 
in December 2003. The data were obtained following the same methodology as in 2002. Of 
the households surveyed both in 2001 and 2002, we mailed the questionnaire to 544 and 
obtained responses from 381. Of those first surveyed in 2002, we sent the questionnaire to 
432 households and received replies from 251. In addition, we mailed the survey to 423 
households which were newly chosen in 2003 and had responses from 349.    Thus, the 
sample size for 2003 is 981 households. 
          The respondents to the survey were the main caregivers in the household. The 
questionnaire covers a variety of items to establish patterns of care use over a period of 
several years, the health condition of caregivers and receivers, and household demographics. 
     Table  1  provides  summary  statistics  of our dataset. We pool the 2001, 2002 and 2003 
survey in order to obtain a large sample size of 479 observations. Note that the survey asks 
respondents to indicate the type of provider they rely on for at-home care services. This is the 
segment on which most for-profits concentrate. The number of households in our sample that 
use for-profit at-home care services is 151 (31.5 percent), while 328 (68.5%) use nonprofit 
providers, implying that nonprofits have still a larger marker share even after the deregulation.   
     Comparing  household  characteristics,  we  find that, users of for-profits have, on average, 
a higher annual income and greater total assets. Moreover, care levels are typically higher for 
users of nonprofit providers. We should note that the share of those who have changed 
providers is much higher among users of for-profits than among of nonprofits. One possible 
explanation of changes of provider is that households become familiar with a provider, are 
dissatisfied, and want to try another provider. But it should be noted that in the survey, the 
dominant case of provider change is from nonprofit to for-profit operators, suggesting that 
                                            
4  The screening results show that households with one care receiver account for 71.1 percent of the total, 
those with two care receivers account for 26.9 percent, and the remainder are households with more than 
two care receivers. Our survey sample is limited to those households with one care receiver since a 
household with two or more care receivers is very different from those with one care receiver in that the 
care burden is more onerous and care is possibly provided by two or more caregivers, which makes it hard 
to identify who cares for whom.     
5  Of the 205 elderly care receivers who no longer lived at home with family members, 75 entered an 
unspecified type of institution, 68 died, and 29 were hospitalized.   households with more knowledge about the quality of care tend to switch from nonprofit to 
for-profit providers. Finally, as was to be expected given that the market for at-home care was 
deregulated only in 2000, the share of those who began using their provider before that year is 
much higher among users of nonprofits than for-profits. 
     Although  the  survey  does  not  contain  any information from suppliers on the quality of 
services, we do have results on care users’ subjective evaluation of the care they receive. 
These results help us to address the first issue referred to in the previous section, namely: 
which type of provider offers higher quality services?    We asked respondents to rate the 
service of their provider (“Excellent”, “Above average”, “Below average”, “Very bad”, and 
“Don’t know”) and divided the results by type of provider. The results are shown in Figure 1 
and yield some interesting conclusions. Generally, the dominant answer is “above average,” 
and this share is higher for nonprofits. In 2001 and 2002, the quality of for-profit providers 
was perceived to be marginally worse than that of nonprofit providers, though uncertainty was 
certainly much higher regarding the quality of for-profit providers.. But we observe a drastic 
change in 2003. The share of users considering the service of their provider to be “excellent” 
for the first time was higher for for-profits than for nonprofits, while at the same time, more 
users of nonprofits judged the service of their provider to be “below” average than user of 
for-profits. Thus, users’ perception of the quality of care provided by for-profits has clearly 
improved, while the reverse seems to be the case for nonprofits. 
          Figure 2 shows the reasons that motivated users’ choice of a nonprofit or for-profit 
provider.” The dominant determinant is the recommendation made by the care manager 
responsible for devising an individual’s care plan once eligibility for insurance-funded care 
has been determined. A recommendation by an acquaintance played a more important role in 
the choice of for-profits than of nonprofits; public reputation also played a more important 
role in the choice of a for-profit provider than a nonprofit provider in 2001 and 2002, though 
this had reversed by 2003. The share of those who began using their provider before 2000 has 
decreased. The share of those who chose nonprofits due to anxiety over using for-profit 
providers is very small, suggesting that there is little apprehension that for-profit providers 
engage in opportunistic behavior. These results indicate that users do not perceive the quality 
of service delivered by either type of provider to be evidently better.   
          In sum, according to respondents’ perception, the quality of care services provided by 
for-profits is not necessarily worse, and the perception of these providers in fact has become 
more favorable. There seems to be little prejudice against profit-seeking behavior that might 
cause users to hesitate in using the services offered by for-profit providers. This brings us to 
the second issue, to be addressed in the next section: which type of provider is preferred by 
consumers.  
 
4.  Estimation and Results 
 
          Based on the discussion in Section 2, we employ the following specification to consider 
the choice users make: 
Zi
*= Xiγ + ui 
Zi =1  if  Zi
*≥0  or  -  ui  ≤ X iγ  
Zi =0  if  Zi
*<0  or  -  ui  > Xiγ  
where Zi
* is the likelihood of a household to choose for-profit providers, which is 
unobservable. However, we can observe Zi, which is a dichotomous variable that takes 1 if a 
user actually chooses a for-profit facility. Xi refers to users’ characteristics that might affect 
choice of provider and includes gender, age, care level, annual income, assets, the relationship 
between care giver and receiver, and a dummy variable for using the same provider since before 2000.
6  γ   is the tendency of a household to choose for-profits. Xi also contains several 
variables to proxy the asymmetry of information. It includes the number of family members, 
since more members can provide more informal care and monitor outside caregivers more 
intensively. It also includes whether a member of the immediate family or a relative is a 
doctor or professional caregiver, since it can be assumed that such households have more 
information on the quality of care. And, naturally, any households that have changed 
providers are also expected to have more information on providers. ui is an error term 
following  ) , 0 (
2
u N σ . 
          Table 2 shows the estimation results. The first column reports the results for the 
random-effects probit model. The coefficients on household income and assets are positive 
but not statistically significant. Households where the elderly patient requires a lower care 
level are more inclined to choose for-profit providers. Regarding family size, larger 
households tend choose nonprofits rather than for-profits. Households with an acquaintance 
who is a medical doctor or a professional caregiver tend to choose nonprofits. Households that 
have changed providers are more inclined to choose for-profits. Moreover, households that 
began using their provider before 2000 tend to be with nonprofits. The estimation using the 
fixed-effects probit model confirms these results. 
  The significant coefficient on the dummy for changing providers indicates that 
households with better knowledge of suppliers tend to choose for-profits, which is consistent 
with our discussion above. “On the other hand, the significant negative coefficient on the 
dummy indicating whether any acquaintance is a medical doctor or professional caregiver 
may be explained by the fact such individuals typically work in the provision of medical or 
institutional care, a field in which at present only nonprofit organizations are allowed to 
operate, and it can be assumed that they are more likely to recommend the same type of 
provider. This result is also consistent with the fact that households with elderly patients 
requiring higher care-levels are inclined to choose nonprofits, since nonprofit providers 
usually offer both institutional care and at-home care and users may be reassured to know 
institutional care services are available should they become necessary as a result of an 
accident or emergency. Finally, we found that nonprofits enjoyed an “advantage” over 
for-profits by virtue of having a longer history of operating in the market. 
In sum, the Japanese long-term care market does not seem to conform to the situation 
predicted by the contract failure hypothesis. Rather, two other factors seem to bias user choice 
towards nonprofits: First, the fact that they have operated in the market since before 
deregulation in 2000; and second, the fact that they are also able to offer medical and/or 
institutional care services, which for profit operators at present are still banned from doing. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
     This  study  takes  advantage  of  original survey data to examine whether households’ 
choice of at-home care service providers is biased toward nonprofit operators, as the contract 
failure hypothesis predicts. Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows. In our 
survey, for-profit providers account for about 40 percent of at-home care, suggesting that 
for-profit operators have met with acceptance following deregulation of market entry along 
with the introduction of the public long-term care insurance scheme. In this sense, for-profits 
have been well received by those who need them following deregulation and the introduction 
                                            
6  In the survey, respondents were provided with a choice of annual income and asset brackets which they 
were asked to tick. We exclude any households falling into lowest categories (less than 2 million yen 
annual income and 3 million yen worth of assets) and the highest (more than 20 million yen annual income 
and 15 million yen worth of assets). of the public long-term care insurance. As regards preferences with respect to nonprofit and 
for-profit providers, households with an elderly patient requiring higher care levels or with an 
acquaintance who is a medical doctor or professional caregiver are more inclined to choose 
nonprofits. Both results are associated with the fact that, as incumbents, only nonprofits offer 
medical or institutional care. In addition, nonprofits enjoy an advantage by virtue of being 
longer in the market. In this sense, proprietary providers are disadvantaged. On the other hand, 
households with better knowledge of providers tend to choose for-profits, which suggests that 
reducing information asymmetry of may help to create a more level playing field. 
     Before  the  introduction  of  the  long-term care insurance scheme in 2000, the private 
provision of health care services was generally viewed with suspicion, based on the fear that 
profit-orientation would lead to opportunistic behavior. However, the growth and success of 
the for-profit sector have allayed such fear and this might be an opportune moment to reassess 
the role and status of the nonprofit sector since equal market access has now be achieved and 
for-profits can compete on an equal footing with nonprofits. Traditionally, nonprofits use 
operating surpluses to cover deficits, grow or reduce bottlenecks, provide community services 
such as charitable care, research, education. (Schlesinger et al.(1996)). With prices and 
contents of services for at-home care regulated by the government, the role of charitable 
organizations in this industry should be reconsidered. 
          In this context, one important issue that would need to be scrutinized is the tax status of 
nonprofit organizations. Like in the U.S., as entities serving the public interest, nonprofits in 
Japan enjoy tax exemptions. However, recent research from the U.S. suggests that in order to 
justify this special treatment, the social benefit provided by nonprofits should be at least equal 
to the benefits provided by profit-seeking firm (community benefits and taxes paid) plus the 
profit these firms generate for their owners (Claxton et al. 1997; Nicholson et al. 2000).   
Future research should examine these issues in Japan in order to allow an assessment 
of the optimal division of labor between different types of providers and the tax treatment of 
nonprofit operators in order achieve this. Such research could also help to inform policies 
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(%)Table 1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Dummy for For-profits  479 0.315 0.465 328 0 0 151 1 0
Annual Household Income (ten thousand yen) 446 733.408 418.135 307 711.889 408.425 139 780.935 436.571
Annual Household Income (natural logarithm) 446 6.432 0.592 307 6.401 0.594 139 6.501 0.582
Total Household Assets (ten thousand yen) 422 4,618.246 4,201.091 289 4,247.924 3,922.566 133 5,422.932 4,665.498
Total Household Assets (natural logarithm) 422 7.950 1.097 289 7.880 1.070 133 8.104 1.144
Care Level (support) 479 0.052 0.223 328 0.043 0.202 151 0.073 0.261
Care Level 1 479 0.207 0.405 328 0.186 0.390 151 0.252 0.435
Care Level 2  479 0.196 0.398 328 0.189 0.392 151 0.212 0.410
Care Level 3 479 0.154 0.362 328 0.143 0.351 151 0.179 0.384
Care Level 4 479 0.146 0.354 328 0.171 0.377 151 0.093 0.291
Care Level 5 479 0.165 0.372 328 0.186 0.390 151 0.119 0.325
Relationship (spouse=1) 479 0.102 0.303 328 0.122 0.328 151 0.060 0.238
Relationship (own parent=1) 479 0.428 0.495 328 0.412 0.493 151 0.464 0.500
Relationship (spouse's parent=1) 479 0.428 0.495 328 0.427 0.495 151 0.430 0.497
Care Receiver's Sex (female=1) 469 0.738 0.440 323 0.728 0.446 146 0.760 0.428
Care Receiver's Age 470 84.038 7.226 324 83.701 7.252 146 84.788 7.136
Number of Family Members 472 3.964 1.447 324 4.019 1.421 148 3.845 1.502
Acquaintances (Doctor or Professional Caregiver) 479 0.336 0.473 328 0.369 0.483 151 0.265 0.443
Dummy for Changing Providers 479 0.123 0.329 328 0.088 0.284 151 0.199 0.400
Dummy for Use Before 2000 475 0.221 0.415 328 0.271 0.445 147 0.109 0.313
Notes: The care levels of individual care receivers are determined by local governments and classified into six categories  (support needed and 1-5) .
         have changed their providers. "Dummy for Use Before 2000" takes 1 for those households that began using the current provider before 2000.
Total   Nonprofit Users For-profit Users
         "Relationship" refers to relationship of the care receiver to the caregiver. "Dummy for Changing Providers" takes 1 for those households thatTable 2 Estimation Results   
  
Dependent Variable : 
For-profits=1 and nonprofits=0 Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Marginal Effect
Annual Household Income (natural logarithm 0.233 0.153 0.234 0.153 0.077
Total Household Assets (natural logarithm) 0.037 0.074 0.037 0.074 0.012
Care Level (support) 0.860 0.435 * 0.843 0.437 * 0.317
Care Level 1 0.747 0.338 * 0.733 0.339 * 0.264
Care Level 2  0.457 0.336 0.446 0.337 0.157
Care Level 3 0.499 0.343 0.490 0.343 0.175
Care Level 4 -0.026 0.368 -0.032 0.368 -0.011
Care Level 5 -0.011 0.349 -0.027 0.351 -0.009
Relationship (spouse=1) 4.854 1.373 *** 4.888 1.378 *** 0.869
Relationship (own parent=1) 5.500 1.478 *** 5.535 1.483 *** 0.991
Relationship (spouse's parent=1) 5.547 1.497 *** 5.586 1.501 *** 0.994
Care Receiver's Sex (female=1) -0.133 0.187 -0.133 0.187 -0.044
Care Receiver's Age 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.005
Number of Family Members -0.099 0.058 * -0.100 0.058 * -0.033
Acquaintances (Doctor or Professional Caregiver) -0.418 0.154 *** -0.415 0.154 *** -0.130
Dummy for Changing Providers 0.558 0.203 *** 0.565 0.203 *** 0.205
Dummy for Use Before 2000 -0.612 0.195 *** -0.605 0.196 *** -0.174








Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, respectively.   
Random Effects Model Fixed Effects Model
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0.133
-217.10721
401
-217.006
-55.88